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ABSTRACT 
Advisory Firm Employee Ownership and Performance in Separately Managed Accounts 
by 
Samuel White Yates 
April 2017 
 
Chair: Conrad Ciccotello 
Major Academic Unit: Finance 
 
I describe in detail the structure of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and how 
those accounts compare to and differ from mutual funds and hedge funds. I then examine 
how employee ownership of advisory firms — that is, firms in which employees have 
partnership or stock interests — affects the performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square 
of each firm’s SMA portfolios. In testing 14,484 different portfolios from more than 
1,100 different advisory firms from 1995 to 2015, I find that SMAs at firms with 
employee ownership outperform SMAs at firms without it. The greatest impact is in the 
25–50% employee-ownership range. Positive returns, risk, and R2 all decrease as 
employee ownership increases beyond 50%, but SMA performance levels remain above 
those of firms in which the portfolio manager has no employee ownership. I also find that 
the Sharpe ratio is negatively related to employee ownership, reflecting a deterioration of 
risk-adjusted returns at higher employee-ownership levels. These results suggest both that 
the presence of advisor employee ownership is a significant, positive indicator for SMA 
performance and that those advisory firms assume more idiosyncratic risk to achieve 
 x 
these higher returns. For investors, my results show that employee ownership of advisory 
firms can be used as a differentiating factor to aid them in making SMA choices between 
portfolios with otherwise similar characteristics.   
 
INDEX WORDS: Separately Managed Accounts, SMA’s, Employee Ownership, 
Performance 
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I.INTRODUCTION  
“In terms of financial innovation, remember that the trend is toward institutional money 
management, delegated portfolio management.” 
                                                                                                                   —Gary Gorton (2010) 
 
From its historical roots as a domain for institutional investors and pension funds, the 
investment industry has grown to a multitrillion-dollar asset class by expanding its reach to 
high net worth investors around the globe. According to the Investment Company Institute 
(2013), more than $20 trillion dollars is currently invested in separately managed accounts 
(SMAs), which Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013) describe simply as asset portfolios 
“managed by a professional management firm.” In contrast, $13 trillion is invested in open-
ended mutual funds, $2.6 trillion in hedge funds, and $265 billion in closed-ended mutual 
funds. And, as Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016) estimate, these reports of assets held 
in SMAs may be small; according to their research, as of 2012, the total amount invested in 
delegated asset managers is $43 trillion.  
As early as 1981, Sharpe indirectly called attention to SMAs when he studied optimal 
allocation and diversification in pension funds; since then, however, researchers have largely 
ignored SMA performance, makeup, and characteristics — despite the fact that they make up 
more than 50% of the investable market in securities. As I describe here, SMAs’ long neglect 
in the investment research universe is partially due to the difficulty of defining what 
constitutes an SMA and what differentiates it from investment brethren such as mutual and 
hedge funds. A second challenge is the lack of high-quality data to analyze. Here, I resurrect 
the study of SMAs by examining their performance in relation to a single characteristic: 
employee ownership of advisory firms. This type of ownership is not a manager’s co-
investment in the fund’s underlying assets, as described in the recent paper by Banerjee, 
 12 
Stukalo, Yates, and Agarwal (2016); rather, it is a form of ownership — such as through 
stock or partnership interest — in the overall management company. As my research shows, 
the differential between employee-owned and non-employee-owned advisory firms is easily 
identifiable in SMAs. Using this variable to separate the two groups could be a valuable tool 
in helping investors discern the likelihood of positive outcomes for their investments. 
I.1 Defining Employee-Owned Advisory Firms 
The primary question here is whether employee ownership of advisory firms makes a 
difference in the characteristics and outcomes of the investment portfolios that the firms 
manage. To more fully define “employee-owned advisory firms,” we can look to a question 
in the Informa database that I use for this study. As Appendix D shows, the question simply 
asks SMA managers the percentage of their advisory firm that is owned by employees; their 
answers ranged from 0 to 100%.  
The broader question of what defines employee-owned firms can be answered only 
generally and in anecdotal terms from the data. Generally speaking, an employee-owned 
advisory firm is a private, smaller firm that forms as a partnership; its primary source of 
almost all revenue is separate account management. Typically, non-employee-owned firms 
are publicly traded, much larger, and offer diversified financial services. Appendix F offers 
examples of an employee-owned firm and non-employee-owned firm that report to the 
Informa database. Hahn Capital Management LLC is 100% employee-owned and reports 
managing approximately $1.6 billion in assets; it has 10 employees and has been in operation 
since 1988. Blackrock is a publicly traded company that reports zero firm ownership by its 
portfolio managers; it reports total assets under management of $4.89 trillion. Also founded 
in 1988, Blackrock has 10,000 employees.  
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I.2 Differentiating Separately Managed Accounts from other Investment Vehicles  
Having offered a general SMA description — that is, “a portfolio of assets managed 
by a professional” (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2013) — I now focus on describing the unique 
features and characteristics that distinguish SMAs from other asset classifications, such as 
mutual and hedge funds (see Appendix C).  
 
Insert Appendix C 
 
A major benefit of the SMA structure is that, unlike mutual funds (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1997; Brown, Goetzmann, and Park, 1997; Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014) and 
hedge funds (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011), SMA portfolios offer less incentive to 
engage in window dressing — that is, reporting higher holdings in winners and lower 
holdings in losers. Because mutual funds and hedge funds are pooled investment vehicles 
and report holdings only on a quarterly basis, funds can invest in different instruments during 
the quarter and “clean them up” just before it is time to report. By their very nature, SMAs 
are the most transparent asset vehicle available to investors. Each account is individually 
held and most (if not all) account holders can see their holdings online at any time. Further, 
SMAs do not have a regulatory mandate to disclose their holdings. Because SMA investors 
have an individual record of their account transactions — that is, the buys and sells — they 
would see any attempt at window dressing for what it was. Thus, with the incentives 
removed, SMA managers accrue no benefit by engaging in window dressing.  
SMA transparency not only provides a defense against window dressing, it typically 
exhibits another characteristic that can benefit the investor and increase performance: 
monitoring. Because the very nature of an SMA is a custom account designed for each 
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investor, investors can monitor their holdings in almost real time, adding another dimension 
to the equation. Further, as Mullally (2016) points out, significant shareholders exercise 
substantial influence and governance over the management firms in which they invest. Here, 
I will argue that large investors act in a similar manner. In most SMA structures, the only 
income that the firm generates is the fee it charges, which is calculated as a percentage of the 
firm’s total assets under management (AUM). If large investors are monitoring their 
accounts carefully and constitute a significant percentage of a manager’s total assets, those 
investors will not only have carte blanche access to the manager and the team, they may also 
influence the manager from a personal standpoint. Large investors are also likely to have 
their own analytic team and software to ensure that the manager is performing and investing 
in a conventional manner. Monitoring also impacts the platforms that distribute the SMA. As 
part of their service to their clients, wire houses and banks often employ their own team of 
analysts and may even use an outside consultant to monitor and report on SMAs. 
Finally, transparency and low barriers to entry/exit can work for or against an 
investor. In the SMA space, evidence shows that picking winners is not only possible but 
beneficial to the investor and, according to Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010), is a workable 
strategy. This approach comes at a cost — usually higher fees — and, once the manager 
posts persistent outperformance, large capital inflows follow, resulting in reduced alpha.  
I.3 SMAs and Performance, Asset Flows, and Investor Behavior 
Some researchers have compared SMA performance and risk characteristics with 
those of mutual funds and other investment vehicles. These researchers include Ippolito and 
Turner (1987); Lakonishok (1992); Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993); Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2000); Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010); Peterson, Iachini, and Lam (2011); Elton, 
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Gruber, and Blake (2013); and Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016). On the whole, they 
found that SMAs outperformed mutual funds and performed at a similar level to index funds 
(Elton, Gruber, and Blake 2013).  
Two other literature streams are prevalent in the study of SMAs. As the following 
examples show, the first stream focuses on the relationship between asset flows and 
performance. Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) found conflicts of interest involving 
investment banks and asset management of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional 
funds as they chronically underperformed their counterparts. Ferson and Khang (2002) used 
SMA flow data to devise a new performance measure using conditioning information to look 
for bias in return-based tests. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) found that, in contrast to mutual 
fund investor counterparts, SMA investors punish poorly performing managers by 
withdrawing assets under their management; the researchers also found that these 
institutional SMA investors do not run proportionately to recent winners.  
The second stream focuses on SMA investors and the fund’s behavior. This research 
includes Goyal and Wahal (2008), who reported that excess returns from institutional SMA 
manager terminations were indistinguishable from zero, although occasionally the changes 
made were positive. Heisler (2007) also looked at the hiring and firing of SMA managers 
and found that both benchmarks and total returns over a long period had a strong influence 
on investor decisions. Del Guercio and Tkac (2000) found that SMA investors are likely to 
be more sophisticated than mutual fund investors, and that they usually perform higher-level 
due diligence than the typical mutual fund investor. For example, both vehicles include 
quantitative screenings, but SMA investors are more likely to rely on risk-adjusted measures 
— such as Jensen’s alpha and tracking error — for performance. Del Guercio and Tkac also 
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found that SMA investors are much less likely to chase excess returns than a mutual fund 
investor. Further, SMA investors often focus on nonperformance measures as well, including 
one-on-one meetings and the manager’s reputation. However, like hedge fund investors, 
SMA investors are more likely to pull money from an underperforming fund than are mutual 
fund investors.  
I.4 Employee Ownership of Advisory Firms and Performance, Risk, and R-square 
Another key question is: When selecting SMAs to invest in, what are some key 
differences among SMA portfolios that can guide investors to make better choices? Elton, 
Gruber, and Blake (2013) gives us a clue as to one possible differentiator: “Separate 
accounts offered by management companies that have mutual funds with the same objective 
do not outperform the mutual funds with which they are matched. Rather, it is the 
independently managed separate accounts, and in particular, those with management 
companies organized as partnerships, that have the best performance” (p. 1719). 
For the remainder of this paper, my focus will on answering and quantifying the 
observation that Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013) made concerning how an advisory firm’s 
ownership structure affects performance. The SMA structure’s flexibility makes this research 
possible because SMA advisors have varying ownership structures, while hedge funds 
advisors are overwhelmingly set up in partnerships and mutual fund advisors have been 
historically owned by financial services companies.  
To investigate this question, I will focus on how employee ownership of advisory 
firms impacts SMA performance, risk, and R-square characteristics using three hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis (performance) proposes that portfolios managed by principals who have 
some percentage of firm ownership will outperform those who do not have incentives 
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beyond those stipulated by their employment contracts. This hypothesis aligns line with a 
larger body of literature concerning incentives and performance. I limit my discussion here 
to the difference between employees and owners. That is, I am testing the hypothesis that 
portfolio managers with an ownership stake in their company outperform those portfolio 
managers who are employees only.  
The second hypothesis (risk) predicts that employee owners will achieve these 
returns using more idiosyncratic risk in their portfolios, signaling that they are better 
informed/more skilled managers than employee-only portfolio managers. I define 
idiosyncratic risk as the portion of total risk that is unaccounted for by systematic risk of the 
market. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) found that idiosyncratic risk matters to a portfolio’s 
return characteristics. This hypothesis will test the assertion that a positive relationship exists 
between the amount of total risk taken by employee-owned advisory firms and 
outperformance in comparison to their non-employee counterparts. This hypothesis will also 
clearly distinguish between manager co-investment in their underlying portfolios and 
managerial ownership in the corporate structure. Banerjee, Stukalo, Yates, and Agarwal 
(2016) found that, as co-investment increased, the idiosyncratic risk increased, but only to a 
certain point; at that point, the manager began to decrease risk-taking.  
The third hypothesis (R-square) proposes that employee owners will be less 
correlated to the market. A negative R-square observation will show that a manager who has 
an ownership stake in a portfolio will exhibit less correlation to the market while achieving 
higher returns. This will also test the findings of Titman and Tiu (2011), who suggest that 
hedge funds with low R-square outperform funds with higher R-square.  
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I test all three hypotheses using data from the Informa Investment Solutions PRN 
enterprise database. Informa is a publicly traded company that serves commercial, 
professional, and academic communities in various sectors by creating and providing access 
to content and intelligence that helps people and businesses work smarter and make better 
decisions faster (for more, see http://informa.com/about-us/informa-at-a-glance). The PRN 
enterprise database contains more than 18,000 separately reporting portfolios from more than 
1,100 different companies. Each portfolio reports individual returns for its particular 
strategy. For example, Aberdeen Asset Management PLC reports on more than 52 different 
portfolios across different strategies and investments, ranging from an international equity 
portfolio to a US high-yield portfolio.  
I begin my analysis by examining the influence of employee ownership on 
performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square. To do this, I run a series of tests to determine 
whether employee ownership has any effect on these characteristics. The tests use return, 
standard deviation (SD) of return, and four generally accepted models of risk that build upon 
one another: the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) one-variable model (Sharpe, 1966); 
Fama and French’s three-factor model (1993); Carhart’s four factor model (1997); and Fung 
and Hsieh’s seven-factor model (2004). 
I obtained the employee ownership of advisory firms variable from the firm’s 
answers to an annual questionnaire (see Appendix D). Unfortunately, if the firm updates or 
changes this answer, it does not change answers from previous years. As I explain in detail 
later, I account for this lack of annual variation in numbers by clustering the standard error 
term and using years in the regressions.  
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The results from these regressions begin to tell a story — namely, that employee 
ownership of advisory firms does influence returns positively and significantly, leading to an 
average of .338% annual outperformance over the 20-year period. This result alone would be 
of keen interest to investors. All factor models reinforce the direction of the coefficients, 
with a range of 0.038 to 0.120 positive alpha generations for the portfolios with employee 
ownership. As I layer in complexity and test for risk, I find that the SD of returns for 
employee-owned portfolios is 1.365% higher than nonemployee-owned portfolios. Similar 
results for direction are observed across all factor models, and they are all significant to the 
1% level or better. When I test for R-square, I find that it is negative across all factor models 
with a range of –0.005 to –0.010. All of the previous results were significant to the 1% or 
better level, with the exception of age in the Fama and French model (Fama and French 
1993) and the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004). Based on these observations, I 
conclude that employee-owned portfolio managers take more idiosyncratic risk that is less 
correlated to the market to achieve their returns.  
Having observed these results, I divide the employee-owned percentages into 
quartiles using 0.0–25% employee-owned as a lagged indicator, then follow with greater 
than 25% to less than or equal to 50%; greater than 50% to less than or equal to 75%; and 
greater than 75% to less than or equal to 100%. This shows a linear decrease in outsized 
returns, with the largest return residing in the second quartile of 0.806%, then decreasing to 
0.319% in the third quartile and to 0.076% in the fourth. While employee ownership was 
beneficial across all quartiles, the benefits decreased in a linear direction from the first 
through the fourth quartiles. The first two quartiles were significant to the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively, while the fourth quartile result was not significant. Similar linear patterns were 
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captured across all models, with the highest observation in the Carhart model (Carhart 1997) 
at 0.190% and the lowest observed in the CAPM model at 0.012%.  
When I examined the influence of employee ownership on risk, I found a similar 
linear pattern among the quartiles. The SD of return was positive and highest at the second 
quartile at 1.853%, with the third and fourth quartiles decreasing to 1.299% and 0.707%, 
respectively. All three observations were significant to the 1% level or better. The pattern 
followed across all factor models; all were positive, with the largest observation from the 
CAPM model at 1.788% in the second quartile and the smallest in the Fung and Hsieh model 
(Fung and Hsieh 2004) at 0.409% in the fourth quartile. 
Finally, I examined the influence of employee ownership of advisory firms on R-
square, and observed an increase in the R-square as employee ownership increases. The 
second quartile shows a higher negative R-square at –0.004 compared to the fourth quartile, 
which had a negative R-square of –0.002. Both observations were significant to the 1% level 
or better. The third quartile also reported a –0.002 but was not significant. The Carhart model 
(Carhart 1997) was the only model that captured significance across the board at the 1% 
level or better with observations of –0.013, –0.008, and –0.007 in the second, third, and 
fourth quartiles, respectively.  
These results strongly suggest that employee ownership in an advisory firm has a 
salutary effect on performance, idiosyncratic risk-taking, and R-square for the SMAs that the 
firm is managing. By running the results through four of the most prominent factor models in 
academic literature — CAPM, Fama and French (Fama and French 1993), Carhart (Carhart 
1997), and Fung and Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004) — I was able to capture intricate patterns 
that would have been undetectable using any one model alone. Then, by further dividing the 
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data into quartiles, I observe the levels at which employee ownership has the most 
pronounced effect. 
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II.DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
II.1 Data Sources 
The data provider is the Informa Investment Solutions (IIS) PSN Enterprise 
investment manager database. Informa’s PSN is a global database of more than 1,100 
investment managers, representing more than 5,000 US and international investment 
products. PSN is a primary data collector, with each firm reporting directly to it. Each firm 
has more than 1,000 data points. The database contains information for 18,414 total funds, 
with 6,000 actively reporting. The service began collecting returns in 1979. The funds 
classify into 12 categories: Collective Trust, Commingled Funds, Exchange Traded Funds, 
Fund of Funds, Hedge Funds, Limited Partnerships, Managed Account (wrap), Mutual Fund, 
Offshore Fund, Single Representative Account, and Separate Account Composite. Of these 
12 categories, 14,484 of reporting funds classify as Separate Account Composite. The 
second largest classification is Managed Account (wrap), with 1,196 funds reporting. A 
feature of the database is that, in addition to AUM, returns, and numerous other 
characteristics, it also reports employee-ownership percentage. In Appendix G, I define the 
categories used for calculating SMA performance as age, size, and ownership. Unlike Busse, 
Goyal, and Wahal (2010), who tested only active portfolio managers, I include the entire 
database of reporting firms for 1995–2015, as my hypothesis focuses on the influence of 
employee ownership on performance, risk, and R-square of all SMAs over the study period. I 
use 1995 as a starting point because, according to Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010), the 
database had survivorship concerns that were rectified beginning in 1995.  
As Appendix B shows, the one drawback in this literature is that the data for 
reporting employee-ownership percentage is not collected in a time series manner. To 
account for the time invariance of my independent variable, I cluster the standard errors. 
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Clustering the standard errors by firm corrects the standard error by accounting for the fact 
that the error terms are correlated. I will also strongly argue that, although the percentages of 
employee ownership may change over time, there will be almost no cases where a company 
reports employee ownership, then no employee ownership, then employee ownership once 
again. If anything, there would be a high likelihood of an upward bias in the reporting of the 
non-employee-owned numbers. 
The reason is straightforward. A company may go from employee-owned to non-
employee-owned in two ways: through a buyout or through an initial public offering (IPO). 
In both cases, the likelihood of either a company (in the buyout case) or a group of investors 
buying stock in an IPO for an underperforming company is very remote. As we have seen for 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and SMA portfolios, strong performance equals inflows. 
Investors buy cash-flow companies that are growing their revenue.  
One example of a company going from employee-owned to non-employee-owned is 
Silvercrest Asset Management. Silvercrest was founded in 2002 as a private partnership 
structured as a Limited Liability Corporation. It offers seven different SMAs to its clients: 
Equity Income, Focused Value, Large Cap Value, Multi Cap Value, Special Situations Muni, 
Smid Value, and Small Cap Value. All of the portfolios are ranked in the top quartile of 
performers over the past 10 years, with one ranking first. Until 2013, Silvercrest was a 
partnership owned substantially by its employees. In June 2013, the company went through 
an IPO. After that date, it no longer listed any employee ownership in the database. In effect, 
the salutatory benefits of employee ownership accrued to the non-employee numbers, 
actually narrowing the performance gap between the two groups. 
Source: http://psn.informais.com/help/psn_enterpriseV2/WebHelp/index.htm 
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II.2  Variable Construction 
I employ six measures for performance; all measures are for the period 1995–2015 
unless otherwise stated. Return is the portfolio’s average annual return for the period. The 
Sharpe ratio is the 20-year average of the portfolios’ monthly excess returns — that is, the 
stated return minus the risk-free rate, divided by the SD of the returns during the same 
period. I then estimate alpha using four widely accepted models: CAPM Alpha is a (Sharpe 
1966), Fama and French Alpha is a three-factor model (Fama and French 1993), Carhart 
Alpha is a four-factor model (Carhart 1997), and Fung and Hsieh Alpha is a seven-factor 
model (Fung and Hsieh 2004). The formulas for these regressions follow. 
CAPM 
𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑎(𝑟𝑚-𝑟𝑟𝑓), 
where 
• a = asset, 
• 𝑟𝑟𝑓 = a risk-free security’s rate of return, 
• 𝑟𝑚 = the expected return of the broad market, and 
• 𝛽𝑎 = the assets beta. 
 
Fama and French three-factor model 
r = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽3(𝐾𝑚- 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑏𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝑏𝑣  ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 +  𝛼, 
where 
• 𝑅𝑓 = a risk-free rate of return, 
• 𝛽 = beta of the portfolio, 
• 𝐾𝑚 = market portfolio return, 
• SMB = small minus big market capitalization, and 
• HML = high minus low book to market ratio. 
 
Carhart four-factor model 
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𝑅 − 𝑅𝑓 = a + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝑀𝐷, 
where 
• R = return of the asset, 
• 𝑅𝑓 = a risk-free rate, 
• a = the unexplained return, 
• Mkt = US market return, 
• HML = high minus low book to market ratio, 
• SMB = small minus big market capitalization, and 
• UMD = up minus down (the momentum factor that mimics the portfolio’s return). 
 
Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model 
𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝐵𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2,𝑖  𝑋𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽3,𝑖  𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4,𝑖  𝐸𝑀𝐹 + 𝛽5,𝑖  𝑆𝑆𝐹
+ 𝛽6,𝑖  𝐵𝑀𝐹 + 𝛽7,𝑖  𝐶𝑆𝐹, 
where  
• BTFF = bond trend-following factor, 
• XTFF = currency trend-following factor, 
• CTFF = commodity trend-following factor, 
• EMF = equity market factor,  
• SSF = size spread factor, 
• BMF = bond market factor, and 
• CSF = credit spread factor. 
 
I then examine the influence of the percentage of employee ownership on 
performance, risk, and R-square using Return, CAPM Alpha, Fama and French Alpha, Fung 
and Hsieh Alpha, and the Sharpe ratio, with Age and Size as control variables. I also look at 
the influence of employee ownership as a dummy variable on performance, risk, and R-
square using the same regressions mentioned above. Alpha is calculated as an in-sample 
regression intercept. For each company in each year, I run the regression against factors and 
get alpha (intercept) and R-square. I then multiply alpha by 12 to annualize it.  
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II.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of employee ownership, performance, 
idiosyncratic risk, and R-square measures over the 20-year period from January 1995 to 
December 2015. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
As the table shows, the mean employee-ownership percentage of the sample is 
51.150%, the mean return is 9.021%, and the mean Sharpe ratio is 0.880. The mean annual 
alphas from the four models range from 0.617 to 1.109%. The average idiosyncratic risk for 
the four models ranges from 6.83 to 12.19%. The range of the R-square is from 0.091 to 
0.659. For control variables, the mean portfolio age is 8.49 years; the mean portfolio size is 
$543.1 million AUM. I report the 1995–2015 findings using monthly returns. To capture a 
reliable age for the portfolios reporting, I also included the 1985–1995 time frame. I further 
restrict the data to only SMAs and similar portfolios and to reported employee ownership. If 
the fund did not answer the question in Informa, the funds were shown as N/A and excluded 
from the sample. Using this time period yielded 18,380 reporting portfolios; of those, 11,751 
reported employee ownership of greater than zero while 6,629 funds reported employee 
ownership as zero. Of the remaining portfolios, 64% reported some employee ownership.  
  
 27 
III.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, PERFORMANCE, 
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK, AND R-SQUARE 
I begin my analysis by conducting tests to analyze the relation between employee 
ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square.  
III.1 Influence of Employee Ownership on Performance 
Table 2 shows the relationship between employee ownership and performance.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that employee ownership is both positive and 
significant at 1% level or better for all factor models in relation to performance, with the 
exception of Sharpe ratio, which was negative and significant. The range of the factor 
models was from 0.0003 to 0.001. Also, the modeled Return coefficient is positive (coeff = 
0.001) but not significant. This result implies that higher employee ownership leads to higher 
returns through higher alpha. The negative Sharpe ratio coefficient (coeff =  –0.0001) 
indicates a very slight to almost nonexistent drag on portfolios’ excess returns, which are an 
interesting conundrum as all of the other factor models reported a positive coefficient. 
When Age is added as a control factor, the results were positive and significant at the 
5% level (coeff = 0.012). Age was significant at the 1% or better level only in the Fung and 
Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004) and was negative (coeff = –0.003). The Sharpe ratio 
was positive and significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = 0.006). The result implies that 
the longer a manager is in business, the better the performance, although alpha may be 
negatively affected. Interestingly, when I add size as a control variable, the result turns 
negative (coeff = –0.284) and is significant at the 1% level or better. Size is also negative and 
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significant across all factor models at the 1% level or better with a range of –0.024 to –0.040. 
The Sharpe ratio is negative and significant at the 5% level (coeff = –0.004). This result 
suggests that SMA managers may have some of the same capacity constraint challenges that 
Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) found in their study of hedge funds. The regression 
for the former table is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡,  
where 
• Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha),  
• EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
 
III.2 Influence of Employee Ownership on Risk 
Table 3 shows the relationship between employee ownership and risk. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis, employee ownership is positive and significant at the 
1% level or better for the SD of returns and across all models in relation to risk. The SD of 
return was positive at 0.008. The factor models’ range was 0.004–0.008. The Age and Size 
control variables were both negative and significant to the 1% or better level across all factor 
models with the coefficients for Age ranging from –0.046 to –0.073. The coefficients for Size 
ranged from –0.059 to –0.152. These results indicate that while Age does increase the SD of 
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returns in younger and smaller portfolios, as the manager gains assets and manages over time 
ownership results in lower risk-taking. The regression for Table 3 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡,  
where 
• Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals 
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk), 
• EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
 
III.3 Influence of Employee Ownership on R-square 
Table 4 shows the relationship between employee ownership and R-square. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find a negative relation between portfolio R-square 
and employee ownership, significant at 1% or better for all factor models except Fung and 
Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004). For example, the CAPM coefficient on employee ownership 
is negative (coeff = –0.00002) and significant at the 1% level. When adding Age as a control 
variable, the results are significant and positive at the 1% level or better (coeff = 0.0002). 
However, when adding Size as a control variable, the results turn negative and significant at 
the 1% or better level (coeff = –0.001). This implies that higher employee ownership during 
the prior year is associated with lower R-square over the following year; that diminishes with 
age, but turns lower again as portfolio managers increase their AUM. This result also implies 
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that managers with an ownership position are more likely to have better skills and 
information than non-owners. Interestingly, the coefficient of the quadratic term of employee 
ownership is significantly positive across all models. As employee ownership increases, 
managers tend to become more risk averse. This tendency is logical, as partnership may 
represent a significant portion of the managers’ net worth and they therefore may take fewer 
risks in the portfolios in return for a stable company, especially as the organization grows its 
assets. The regression for the Table 4 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡 ,    
where 
• R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model 
regression), 
• EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
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IV.INFLUENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP USING A DUMMY VARIABLE ON 
PERFORMANCE, RISK, AND R-SQUARE 
I divided the data into two sets, using a dummy variable of (1) if employee ownership 
is greater than zero and (0) if employee ownership is reported as zero. I then conducted tests 
to analyze the relation between employee ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and 
R-square to paint a broader picture of employee ownership’s effect on SMA portfolios.  
IV.1 Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on Performance 
Table 5 shows the relationship between employee ownership (dummy variable) and 
performance.  
 
Insert Table 5 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis, the relationship between employee ownership and 
performance is positive and significant at a 1% or better level across return and all factor 
models. The Sharpe ratio is again negative. The coefficient for Return (coeff = 0.338) is of 
particular interest which implies that investors in portfolios with employee ownership of 
greater than zero received a 0.338% higher return annually over the study’s 20-year period 
than investors who put their capital with portfolio managers who had no employee 
ownership. The alphas generated from the factor models were positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level or greater with a range of 0.038 to 0.120. The Sharpe ratio was 
once again negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = –0.071). 
When adding the control variable of Age, the results were positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level (coeff = 0.011) for Return, but were once again negative and 
statically significant (coeff = –0.003) in the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004); 
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this is similar to the findings of the broader performance statistics reported in Table 2. Size 
also reflected similar results to those shown in Table 2 in that the return was negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = –0.277) and the factor models were 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better with a range of –0.023 to –
0.040. Finally, the Sharpe ratio was negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
(coeff = –0.003). The regression Table 5 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
+   ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1
+  𝜀𝑡, 
where 
• Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha), 
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
employee ownership is positive, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years,  
• Size = log(AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
 
4.2 Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on Risk 
Table 6 shows the relationship between employee ownership (dummy variable) and risk. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis, employee ownership (dummy variable) and 
idiosyncratic risk is positive and significant at a 1% or better level across the SD of return 
and all factor models. The SD of return is 1.365. The range of the factor models is 1.136 to 
1.315. The coefficient of the quadratic term is positive across all factor models, implying that 
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employee ownership has a dampening effect on risk-taking. However, as reported in Table 3, 
the results turn negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better for the SD of 
return as well as for the factor models when the control variables Age (coeff = –0.075) and 
Size are introduced. The regression for Table 6 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡 ,     
where 
• Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals 
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk), 
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
employee ownership is positive, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log(AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
 
4.3 Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on R-square 
I now analyze the relationship between employee ownership and R-square using a 
dummy variable.  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
As Table 7 shows, consistent with my hypothesis, a negative relationship exists 
between portfolio R-square and employee ownership (the dummy variable), significant at 1% 
or better with all factor models except CAPM, which was significant at the 5% level. The 
range of the four models is –0.005 to –0.010. Once again, as in Table 4, the control variable 
Age was statistically significant and positive at the 1% level or better across all factor models 
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(with a range of 0.0002 to 0.001), and the control variable Size (lagged) was negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level or better for two of the four factor models: CAPM 
(coeff = –0.001) and Fung and Hsieh (coeff = –0.002). The regression for Table 7 is as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑡
2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
24
𝑘=4 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡 ,      
where 
• R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model 
regression),  
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
employee ownership is positive, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size =log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 =time factor. 
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V.INFLUENCE OF EMPLOYEE-OWNERSHIP RANGES ON PERFORMANCE, 
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AND R-SQUARE 
As I now describe, I conducted various tests to analyze and compare the relation and 
differences between employee ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square 
within quartiles using the control variables of Age and Size.  
V.1 Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on Performance 
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on performance using quartiles to 
examine the differences between ownership percentages. 
 
Insert Table 8 
As Table 8 shows, the results are interesting in that the return and factor models are 
uniformly positive and significant to the 1% level or better across the board — with two 
exceptions. The return for employee ownership between 50–75% is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, while employee ownership at 75–100% shows no significance. 
The Sharpe ratio is once again negative, with a decreasing range of –0.081 to –0.049. Return 
decreases with increased ownership, with the most pronounced effect from the second 
quartile (25–50%) to the third quartile (50–75%), of 0.806 to 0.319 to 0.076%. This 0.73% 
annual decrease in return could be costly to investors over a 20-year time period. The alpha 
also decreases with increased ownership across all models; Carhart (Carhart 1997) shows the 
greatest range, with a high of 0.190 in the second quartile to a low of 0.012 in the fourth. The 
highest return and alpha figures are in the range of 25–50% employee ownership, implying 
that outside ownership SMAs may have a positive effect. This result is in line with Mullally 
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(2016), who explored the effects of outside ownership in hedge funds and concluded that 
they were positive.  
 
The control variables of Age and Size continued to have similar results as described in 
Tables 2 and 5. Age was positive and significant to the 5% level for Return (coeff = 0.013). 
As in the previously mentioned tables, Age was negative and significant at the 1% level or 
better only in the Fung and Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004) factor model (coeff = –0.003). Size 
was negative and significant at the 1% level or better for Return (coeff = –0.282) and across 
all factor models, with a range of –0.023 to –0.040. The regression for Table 8 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1
+  𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
+   ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
26
𝑘=6
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1
+  𝜀𝑡 , 
where 
• Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha),  
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
 
V.2 Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on Risk 
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on risk using quartiles to 
examine the differences between ownership percentages. 
 
Insert Table 9 
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As Table 9 shows, the results are again uniformly positive and significant at the 1% 
level or better for the SD of returns and across all models. The SD follows the performance 
pattern in that it is higher at the lower levels of ownership, with an observation of 1.853 in 
the second quartile, and then decreases in a linear and rather pronounced way to 0.707 in the 
fourth quartile. The risk is also reduced across the board, with the highest observation in 
CAPM of 1.788 in the second quartile and the lowest observation in Fung and Hsieh (Fung 
and Hsieh, 2004) of 0.615 in the fourth quartile. This result continues to strengthen the 
hypothesis that higher ownership leads to a decrease in risk-taking activity.  
 
Also, adding the control variables of Age and Size (lagged) have an observed effect 
on decreasing risk-taking. Age and Size were negative and significant to the 1% level or 
better for both SD of return: Age (coeff = –0.071) and Size (coeff = –0.163) and in all factor 
models with a range of –0.044 from the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004) to –
0.069 in CAPM for Age, and a range of –0.058 from the Fung and Hsieh model (Fund and 
Hsieh 2004) to –0.150 for CAPM. The regression for Table 9 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1 +  𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
26
𝑘=6 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡, 
where 
• Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals 
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk), 
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
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V.3 Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on R-square 
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on R-square using quartiles to 
examine the differences between ownership percentages. 
 
Insert Table 10 
 
As Table 10 shows, the results of the analysis on R-square proved to be a mixed bag. 
The only model that showed significance at the 1% level or better across all ranges was the 
Carhart model (Carhart 1997). The observations were negative beginning in the second 
quartile (coeff = –0.013) and decreased in a linear manner to the third quartile (coeff = –
0.008) and finally to the fourth quartile (coeff = –0.007). Age was positive and significant at 
the 1% level across all models with a range of 0.0002 to 0.001. Size was negative and 
statistically significant as observed only in CAPM (coeff = –0.001) and the Fung and Hsieh 
model (coeff = –.0002) (Fung and Hsieh 2004). The regression for Table 10 is as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1 +  𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
26
𝑘=6 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
20
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡,    
where 
• R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model 
regression), 
• 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable, 
• Age = total period of reporting in years, 
• Size = log (AUM), and 
• 𝜑𝑡 = time factor. 
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VI.ACADEMIC DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I accomplished two objectives: I explained the relationship between 
employee ownership of advisory firms and SMAs in terms of performance, risk, and R-
square; and I defined SMAs as an asset structure and described how they differ from other 
structures, such as mutual funds and hedge funds. Defining and then differentiating SMAs 
from hedge and mutual funds was critical as it helps situate the study’s results within a 
broader context. Mullally (2016) examined hedge fund advisors that sell ownership stakes; 
the implication being that hedge fund managers were full owners of their respective funds at 
a point prior. Unlike mutual funds, which are dominated by a few large firms with de 
minimis employee ownership, SMAs sit at the crossroads, with some advisory firms having 
substantial employee ownership, while others have no employee ownership. SMAs are thus a 
unique structure through which to study the ownership phenomena and perhaps generalize 
the benefits of ownership across structures.  
My results confirmed the tested hypotheses. In testing performance between the two 
distinct groups of separate account management firms — those with and without employee 
ownership — I found that the employee-owned firms strongly outperformed the non-
employee-owned firms from a total return perspective over the 20-year study. 
My first hypothesis was that SMA portfolios managed by employees with a stake in 
the firm would outperform those managed by those without a stake in the firm. I confirmed 
this hypothesis, with the results showing that the employee-owned SMA portfolios 
outperformed non-employee-owned SMA portfolios by an average of 0.338% annualized 
over the life of the study. The most notable outperformance here was in the 25–50% 
ownership range, which reported an average outperformance of 0.806% annualized over the 
study period. These two results are in line with the findings of Elton, Gruber and Blake 
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(2013) who noted that partnerships, which are employee-owned by definition, outperformed 
all other management structures for SMA portfolios. Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) also 
found that institutional fund portfolios run by people employed by investment banks 
underperformed those who weren’t. This is their paper’s key finding; after all, performance 
is the one requisite ingredient for a firm’s survival and long-term success. Although flows 
are the direct mechanism for a firm’s increased revenue, without performance, firms 
eventually wither and die. This follows on Lim and Weisbach (2016), who found that, 
among money management firms, good current performance is an indirect incentive as it 
increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. Further, in their study, the 
best performance seems to have come from firms that included outside ownership of up to 
75% of their company. This leads to further questions about who these outside owners are 
and what their role is in determining manager success. My results also bode well for the 
literature stream on SMA portfolio performance persistence led by Busse, Goyal, and Wahal 
(2010). In finding that employee-owned firms outperform non-employee-owned firms, it 
would follow that flows would increase and thus further benefit the manager. In reporting on 
investor behavior following outperformance, Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993), Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Heisler et al. (2007) all find that flows did increase and 
persist, thus leading to a virtuous cycle rewarding both manager and investor.  
My second hypothesis — that employee-owned SMA portfolio managers take more 
idiosyncratic risks than their non-employee-owned counterparts — was also validated by the 
study’s results. The standard deviation was 1.365 with employee-owned portfolios versus 
non-employee-owned using a dummy variable; the observation was most pronounced at the 
ownership range of 25–50%, which is similar to the performance measurement’s result of 
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1.853. This risk result aligns with Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) who found that 
idiosyncratic risk matters in achieving higher returns.  
 
My third hypothesis — that R-square would be lower with employee-owned versus 
non-employee-owned SMA portfolio managers — was also observed. In each regression I 
ran, the sign was consistently negative and significant. These results support Titman and Tiu 
(2011), who asserted that higher-performing portfolios usually exhibited a lower correlation 
to the market, as reflected in the R-square result.  
I have offered several potential explanations for the risk result, which I think is the 
most interesting finding to emerge from this research. The most logical explanation is that 
managers who open their own firms already have a strong track record of success. If their 
record had been mediocre, the likelihood of their leaving an existing position and bringing 
clients with them would be very low. So, opening a firm strongly suggests that the 
founders/portfolio managers are better skilled and more confident than their counterparts in 
non-employee-owned firms both at identifying risk and capitalizing on it to provide higher 
returns. This follows the logic expressed by Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2010) and 
Chevalier and Ellison (1998), who found that higher-performing managers tended to be 
richly rewarded, while lower-performing managers tend to disappear from the investing 
industry.  
A second possible explanation is that the incentives for a portfolio manager to avoid 
herd behavior are strong. In an industry as competitive and transparent as portfolio 
management, managers have strong incentives to outperform. If you outperform your peers 
and are on the right platforms, you will have a strong flow of dollars to manage. If you 
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underperform, the barriers to investors leaving you are essentially only the tax consequences 
of the change; positions can be liquidated and the money sent to a new manager in a single 
day. By their very nature, employee-owned firms are much less likely to have as high a 
turnover as non-employee-owned firms. In an employee-owned firm, when you fire the 
portfolio manager, you are, in effect, firing yourself; as a result, a fund shuts down. In the 
mutual fund industry, turnover is more common. Kostovetsky and Warner (2015) studied the 
period 1995–2009 and found that approximately 14% of all portfolio managers were 
terminated annually, resulting in 11,405 departures. The most common correlation they 
found was between termination and fund underperformance. Chevalier and Ellison (1998) 
also found that mutual fund managers were terminated for performance-related reasons. 
According to their research, younger managers were more likely to be terminated than older 
ones, leading portfolio managers to avoid unsystematic risk and to tend toward herd behavior 
and investments in more conventional portfolio investments. In their work, Guerrieri and 
Kondor (2009) described the “reputational premium” phenomenon: when investors believe 
managers have the talent to perform, those managers are more willing to take on default risk 
to avoid being fired. Once those managers gamble and take on a higher risk profile, one of 
two things happens: they are rewarded for that risk with higher performance or they are fired. 
The ones who are rewarded then have other options, such as to move to a hedge fund or 
another mutual fund for higher compensation. Depending on their experience, the ones who 
are fired are likely to resume their career in the mutual fund industry at another firm. 
Managers who do not take on a higher risk profile are likely to exhibit herding behavior, 
purchasing securities that are in line with the style standard and thus greatly reducing their 
ability to outperform their competitors.  
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One final and somewhat controversial finding that merits discussion is that, although 
there is a clear and beneficial difference in performance between firms that have employee-
ownership and those that don’t, as firms increase their percentage of employee ownership, 
they seem to obtain higher returns at the expense of higher risk. This is revealed through the 
negative coefficient for the Sharpe ratio when interpreting the effect of employee ownership 
on performance. The summary statistic on the Sharpe ratio was positive, which suggests that 
the firms with higher employee ownership take more risks to achieve higher returns; this 
suggestion was reiterated in the findings on risk. It is certainly an area that merits further 
study.  
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VII.PRACTITIONER DISCUSSION 
This paper contributes to industry practitioners in two key ways that parallel the 
academic discussion. First and foremost, I have identified one easily sortable characteristic 
that can help even novice investors choose better managers. As a practitioner for nearly 25 
years, this idea was a driving factor of my research. My results show that investors looking at 
SMAs can benefit from asking one simple question: “Does the advisory firm have employee 
ownership? By choosing an employee-owned SMA, investors immediately give themselves a 
higher likelihood of ultimately capturing that 0.338–0.806% of annual outperformance over 
time.  
As investors grow more sophisticated, they can look at the percentage of employee 
ownership to gain further potential advantage. My results indicate that 25–50% employee 
ownership is optimal for achieving the highest portfolio performance. In such cases, at least 
50% of the firm’s ownership is external to the employees, which constitutes a strong 
influence and thus might increase the portfolio manager’s discipline. As the ownership 
grows above 50%, the benefit dissipates in a linear fashion, but is still present at 100% 
ownership. The tradeoff here seems to be that the managers are taking more risks than their 
counterparts to get their returns, as manifested by a negative Sharpe coefficient. In plain 
language, this typically means higher volatility. Thus, investors with shorter time horizons 
might want to exercise caution when investing in these portfolios, as timing may matter more 
than in portfolios at firms with a lower percentage of employee ownership. 
Also in this paper, I give a clear working definition and description of an SMA. In 
simple terms, I compare and contrast SMAs with both mutual funds and hedge funds, 
describe their possible benefits to investors, and situate them in the investing world. I then 
test a general rule: people with ownership positions outperform those without them. I 
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carefully follow the rules of science required to make a statement about any financial 
subject, including getting robust and reliable data, formulating hypotheses, running 
regressions, finding significance, and arriving at critically examined conclusions. As a result, 
I can say to practitioners that SMA managers with some level of corporate employee 
ownership have historically had higher returns than those without that ownership. Further, I 
can say that they have achieved these returns by taking more risks and have been less 
correlated to the market overall.  
My final contribution to practitioners is to give them another tool to help them 
differentiate among SMAs when choosing to invest. In their conclusion, Coggan, Fabozzi, 
and Rahman (1993) challenged researchers to do more to discover some of the 
characteristics that make successful money managers. As the Informa database notes, as an 
investment professional, I have the ability to invest in more than 14,000 SMAs. After 
deciding the amount to allocate to equities and fixed income, then the amount to allocate to 
Small Cap versus Large Cap, or Value versus Growth, or International versus Domestic, I’m 
still left with hundreds of investable portfolios in each category. I hope that adding this 
indicator will be useful to my fellow investment professionals when making allocation 
decisions.  
Finally, for both academics and practitioners, I hope that my explanation of what an 
SMA is will help them understand this important and growing segment of the investment 
universe. 
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VIII.TABLES 
Table 1: Summary table 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables. The dependent variable is % of Employee 
Ownership. Return is an annualized return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly 
returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM, Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. 
Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. SD of Return is the annualized standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk 
is the annualized SD of residuals in the corresponding factor models. R-sqr is the R-square of the 
corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, 
assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural 
logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
% of Employee Ownership 141,392 51.150 44.700 0.000 100.000 
      
Performance measures 
     
Return 154,725 9.021 14.550 –18.260 34.040 
Sharpe 154,705 0.880 1.426 –2.001 3.825 
CAPM Alpha 154,725 0.617 1.232 –1.737 2.759 
Fama and French Alpha 154,725 0.895 1.380 –1.880 3.311 
Carhart Alpha 154,725 1.109 1.525 –2.192 3.748 
Fung and Hsieh Alpha 154,725 0.745 1.876 –2.805 3.888 
      
Risk measures 
     
SD of Return 154,725 12.190 8.324 0.000 133.600 
CAPM Idiosyncratic Risk 154,725 11.680 8.141 0.000 132.700 
Fama and French Idiosyncratic Risk 154,725 10.520 7.455 0.000 132.500 
Carhart Idiosyncratic Risk 154,725 9.878 7.117 0.000 132.200 
Fung and Hsieh Idiosyncratic Risk 154,725 6.830 5.266 0.000 94.290 
      
R-sqr measures 
     
CAPM R-sqr 154,724 0.091 0.127 0.000 0.901 
Fama and French R-sqr 154,724 0.264 0.173 0.000 0.998 
Carhart R-sqr 154,724 0.354 0.188 0.001 1.000 
Fung and Hsieh R-sqr 154,724 0.659 0.188 0.039 1.000 
      
Control variables 
     
Age 154,725 8.49 6.026 0.417 30.92 
Size 120,874 5.431 2.372 –4.605 13.21 
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Table 2: Influence of the employee ownership % on performance 
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized 
return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of monthly returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM, 
Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in years) 
is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being 
reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized 
at 1% and 99%.  
  Return 
CAPM 
Alpha 
Fama and 
French 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
Fung and 
Hsieh 
Alpha 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 % of Employee 
Ownership  
0.001 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** –0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
 Age  0.012** 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) –0.003*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
 Size (lagged)  –0.284*** –0.024*** –0.034*** –0.040*** –0.024*** –0.004** 
 
(0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 Constant  17.910*** 1.090*** 0.756*** 0.671*** 2.165*** 1.060*** 
  (0.233) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.030) (0.025) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,008 
 R-sqr  0.530 0.543 0.485 0.445 0.520 0.436 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.530 0.543 0.485 0.445 0.520 0.436 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 3: Influence of the employee ownership % on risk 
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is the annualized 
standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is the annualized SD of residuals in the corresponding factor models. 
Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month 
of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. 
 
SD of Return 
CAPM 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fama and 
French 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Carhart 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fung and 
Hsieh 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
% of Employee 
Ownership 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Age –0.074*** –0.073*** –0.064*** –0.061*** –0.046*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
Size (lagged) –0.165*** –0.152*** –0.144*** –0.134*** –0.059*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
      
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 10.090*** 9.855*** 8.708*** 7.871*** 5.092*** 
 
(0.174) (0.169) (0.157) (0.149) (0.109) 
Observations 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
R-sqr 0.224 0.233 0.220 0.228 0.230 
Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.224 0.233 0.220 0.228 0.230 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 4: Influence of the employee ownership % on R-sqr 
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the 
R-square of the corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of 
the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the 
database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. 
  
CAPM  
R-sqr 
Fama and 
French  
R-sqr 
Carhart 
R-sqr 
Fung and 
Hsieh R-sqr 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 % of Employee 
Ownership  
–0.00002*** –0.0001*** –0.0001*** (0.000) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 Size (lagged)  –0.001*** 0.000 0.000 –0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 Constant  0.032*** 0.213*** 0.399*** 0.750*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
 R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.327 0.385 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.327 0.385 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 5: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on performance 
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized 
return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly returns on corresponding factors of the 
CAPM, Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in 
years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being 
reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at 
1% and 99%.  
  Return 
CAPM 
Alpha 
Fama and 
French 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
Fung and 
Hsieh 
Alpha 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Employee 
 ownership 
 dummy (1/0)  
0.338*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.120*** 0.044*** –0.071*** 
(0.072) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
       
 Age  0.011* 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) –0.003*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
 Size (lagged)  –0.277*** –0.023*** –0.033*** –0.040*** –0.025*** –0.003** 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 Constant  17.670*** 1.066*** 0.711*** 0.610*** 2.146*** 1.082*** 
  (0.235) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,008 
 R-sqr  0.531 0.544 0.486 0.446 0.520 0.436 
 Adjusted R-
sqr  
0.530 0.543 0.486 0.446 0.520 0.436 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 6: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on risk 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is the 
annualized standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is the annualized SD of residuals in the 
corresponding factor models. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the 
product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the 
AUM. 
  
SD of 
Return 
CAPM 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fama and 
French 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Carhart 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fung and 
Hsieh 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Employee 
 ownership dummy 
 (1/0)  
1.365*** 1.313*** 1.199*** 1.136*** 0.794*** 
(0.054) (0.052) (0.048) (0.046) (0.034) 
      
 Age  –0.075*** –0.073*** –0.064*** –0.062*** –0.047*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
 Size (lagged)  –0.165*** –0.153*** –0.145*** –0.135*** –0.059*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
      
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 Constant  9.472*** 9.272*** 8.186*** 7.376*** 4.734*** 
  (0.175) (0.170) (0.158) (0.150) (0.110) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
 R-sqr  0.227 0.236 0.223 0.231 0.233 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.227 0.236 0.223 0.231 0.233 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 7: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on R-sqr 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the R-square of 
the corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, 
assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural 
logarithm of the AUM. 
  
CAPM  
R-sqr 
Fama and 
French  
R-sqr 
Carhart  
R-sqr 
Fung and 
Hsieh R-sqr 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Employee 
 ownership dummy 
 (1/0)  
–0.001** –0.007*** –0.010*** –0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
 Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 Size (lagged)  –0.001*** 0.000 0.000 –0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 Constant  0.031*** 0.215*** 0.402*** 0.753*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
 R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.328 0.385 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.328 0.385 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 8: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on performance 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized return. 
Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM, Fama and 
French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in years) is an 
approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the 
database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
  Return 
CAPM 
Alpha 
Fama and 
French Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
Fung and 
Hsieh Alpha 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Employee ownership 
 (>25% & =<50%)  
0.806*** 0.076*** 0.135*** 0.190*** 0.095*** –0.081*** 
(0.146) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) 
       
 Employee ownership 
 (>50% & =<75%)  
0.319** 0.036*** 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.051*** –0.076*** 
(0.135) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) 
       
 Employee ownership 
(>75% & =<100%)  
0.076 0.012** 0.032*** 0.054*** 0.027*** –0.049*** 
(0.069) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
        Age  0.013** 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) –0.003*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        Size (lagged)  –0.282*** –0.023*** –0.033*** –0.040*** –0.024*** –0.004** 
 
(0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
 Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 Constant  17.850*** 1.085*** 0.748*** 0.661*** 2.158*** 1.063*** 
  (0.233) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,008 
 R-sqr.  0.531 0.544 0.486 0.446 0.520 0.436 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.530 0.543 0.486 0.446 0.520 0.436 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 9: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on risk 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is the annualized 
standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is annualized SD of residuals in corresponding factor models. Age 
(measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month 
of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. 
  
SD of 
Return 
CAPM 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fama and French 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Carhart 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Fung and Hsieh 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Employee 
ownership (>25% 
& =<50%)  
1.853*** 1.788*** 1.642*** 1.571*** 1.013*** 
(0.109) (0.106) (0.098) (0.093) (0.068) 
       Employee 
ownership (>50% 
& =<75%)  
1.299*** 1.255*** 1.137*** 1.090*** 0.756*** 
(0.100) (0.097) (0.090) (0.086) (0.063) 
       Employee 
ownership (>75% 
& =<100%)  
0.707*** 0.696*** 0.649*** 0.615*** 0.409*** 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.032) 
       Age  –0.071*** –0.069*** –0.061*** –0.058*** –0.044*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
 Size (lagged)  –0.163*** –0.150*** –0.141*** –0.132*** –0.058*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
       Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Constant  9.997*** 9.766*** 8.627*** 7.793*** 5.045*** 
  (0.173) (0.169) (0.156) (0.148) (0.109) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
 R-sqr  0.226 0.235 0.222 0.230 0.232 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.226 0.235 0.222 0.230 0.232 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 10: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on R-sqr 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the R-square of 
corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the 
product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. 
  
CAPM 
 R-sqr 
Fama and French R-
sqr 
Carhart  
R-sqr 
Fung and Hsieh R-
sqr 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Employee ownership (>25% & 
=<50%)  
–0.004*** –0.010*** 
–
0.013*** 
0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
 Employee ownership (>50% & 
=<75%)  
–0.002 –0.003* 
–
0.008*** 
–0.004* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
 Employee ownership (>75% & 
=<100%)  
–0.002*** –0.006*** 
–
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Size (lagged)  –0.001*** 0.000 0.000 –0.002*** 
 
–0.0001 –0.0002 –0.0002 –0.0002 
      Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Constant  0.032*** 0.213*** 0.399*** 0.750*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Observations  101,022 101,022 101,022 101,022 
 R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.328 0.385 
 Adjusted R-sqr  0.433 0.378 0.328 0.385 
*p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 11: Pairwise mean difference analysis 
This table reports p-values of pairwise mean difference analysis of mean returns and standard deviation of returns of 
corresponding groups of SMAs based on employee ownership. ANOVA analysis showed statistically significant 
difference of means for both measures. 
2. a Mean difference analysis of performance (Returns) 
  [0,25] (25,50] (50,75] 
(25,50] 0.000     
(50,75] 0.005 0.231   
(75,100] 0.000 0.061 0.711 
 
 
2. b Mean difference analysis of risk (SD of Returns) 
  [0,25] (25,50] (50,75] 
(25,50] 0.000     
(50,75] 0.000 0.000   
(75,100] 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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IX.EXHIBITS 
 
Exhibit 1: Mean returns
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Exhibit 2: Mean SD of Returns 
  
59 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
% Employee Ownership Variable that describes whether or not the reporting portfolio 
has any employee ownership at the company level, and if so, 
what percentage 
Performance Variables  
Return Average annual return of the portfolios from 1995 to 2015 
Sharpe Ratio Annualized average of the portfolios excess returns (e.g., the 
return minus the risk-free rate) divided by the standard 
deviation of its returns over the same period 
CAPM Alpha Alpha for the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe,1966) is 
calculated using equation (1)  
Fama and French Alpha Alpha for the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and 
French 1993) is calculated using equation (2) 
Carhart Alpha Alpha of the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) is 
calculated using equation (3)  
Fung and Hsieh Alpha Alpha for the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model (Fung and 
Hsieh, 2004) is calculated using equation (4) 
Control Variables  
Age The number of months the firm was reporting 
Size Assets under management (AUM) in millions 
Risk Measures  
Standard Deviation of 
Return 
The average annual return volatility of the portfolios for 1995–
2015 
CAPM Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
See CAPM Alpha for equation 
Fama and French 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
See Fama and French Alpha for equation 
Carhart Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
See Carhart Alpha for equation 
Fung and Hsieh 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
See Fung and Hsieh Alpha for equation 
R-square Measures  
CAPM R-square See CAPM Alpha for equation 
Fama and French R-
square 
See Fama and French Alpha for equation 
Carhart R-square See Carhart Alpha for equation 
Fung and Hsieh R-
square 
See Fung and Hsieh Alpha for equation 
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Appendix B: Data Gathering Process: Informa Investment Solutions Example 
This screenshot shows an example of how the database is aggregated and then divided for access. The top 
left column lets users search by field and offers drop-down menus for specific information on the firm, 
products, and performance. Once users select a particular characteristic, such as “rate of return,” the 
information moves to the middle column. They can then separate the information further by choosing 
particular characteristics or time frames in the box on the right. The portfolio database then calculates the 
requested data and displays it alongside each portfolio at the bottom of the page.  
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Appendix C: Characteristics of SMAs vs. Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds 
The following table compares the characteristics of separately managed accounts (SMAs), hedge funds, and 
mutual funds. The table summarizes work from Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013); Busse, Goyal, and 
Wahal (2010); Del Guercio and Tkac (2000); and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013), a well as my own 25 
years of experience in the field. 
Characteristics of SMAs, Hedge Funds, and Mutual Funds 
  SMA Mutual Fund Hedge Fund 
Registration None Yes, under Investment 
Act of 1940 
Yes, if greater than 
$150mm AUM 
Minimums $100k to $25 mm $250 to $10,000 $250k to $25mm 
Fees Negotiable Fixed at share class Fixed at share class 
Incentives Rare Rare Usual 
High Water Marks Rare Rare Usual 
Board Oversight No Yes Yes 
Assets Held Individual securities Pooled Pooled 
Tax  Individual Pooled Pooled 
Reporting Not required to report 
returns to SEC 
Required to report 
returns 
Required to report 
returns if registered  
Customizable Yes No  No 
Compensated by 
Percentage of AUM 
Yes Yes Yes 
Incentive for Risk 
Shifting 
Neutral High High 
Flow in Relation to 
Performance 
Linear Highly convex Highly convex 
Investor Accreditation 
Required 
No No Yes 
Allocated by a 
Professional 
Usually Sometimes  Usually 
Style Specific Mandate Often Often Varies 
Window Dressing 
Present 
No Yes Yes  
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Appendix D: Informa Gathers Ownership Data 
 
Informa gathers ownership data through the following question: 
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Appendix E: Sample Firms  
Following are basic information about two sample firms — one employee-owned and the other non-
employee-owned, as well as further information copied from the “About Us” section of each firm’s 
website.  
 
 Hahn Capital Management 
LLC 
BlackRock 
Employee ownership at 
manager level* 
Yes No 
Total AUM $1.6 Billion $4.89 Trillion 
Number of employees 10 12,000 
Corporate structure Private/ LLC Public 
Year founded 1988 1988 
*as self-reported by Informa Investment Solutions 
 
Employee-owned firm: Hahn Capital 
http://www.hahncap.com/index.html 
 
About Hahn Capital Management 
Hahn Capital Management, LLC, is a boutique, value-focused investment management 
firm based in San Francisco, California. We specialize in buying shares of mid-sized 
companies with a market capitalization between $1 Billion and $20 Billion. 
The firm was founded on the investment philosophy that risk management is the key to 
superior and consistent equity returns over long periods of time. The protection of our 
clients’ investment capital is at the core of our investment decision process, so when 
analyzing each business opportunity, the first question we ask is: “How much can we 
lose?” Once this question is addressed, we then examine the potential investment return. 
The firm was founded in 1988 by Elaine F. Hahn. It is 100% employee-owned, as we 
believe that all professionals in the firm should have the opportunity to share in the 
growth and success of the business through equity ownership.  
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Our diverse group of clients includes public institutions, corporations, family offices, 
separately managed account (SMA) and unified managed account (UMA) programs, as 
well as high net worth individuals. We strive to provide the highest quality of service to 
our clients, irrespective of the size of each portfolio. 
Our team of investment professionals has extensive experience in market and security 
analysis, portfolio management and client service. More important, we share the values 
and goals that have served our clients well over the years: honesty, trustworthiness, 
dedication to excellence, and a passion for the investment business. 
 
Non-employee-owned firm: BlackRock 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/about-us 
BlackRock is trusted to manage more money than any other investment firm*. Our 
business is investing on behalf of our clients — from large institutions to parents and 
grandparents, teachers, nurses, doctors and people from all walks of life who entrust their 
savings to us. 
 We work only for our clients. Our promise is to give them insight into what to do with 
their money, providing products and services that can help them build a better financial 
future. 
Global capabilities 
BlackRock has world-class capabilities designed for our clients’ greatest needs, with a 
comprehensive range of products and services across asset classes, geographies and 
investment strategies. We have expertise in every region around the world, with 135 
investment teams in 30 countries sharing their best thinking in order to seek better 
returns. 
Who we serve 
Our clients come from every corner of the globe. They are governments, companies, 
foundations, and millions of individuals saving for retirement, their children’s educations 
and a better life. 
Our singular focus 
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We’re passionate about our work and intensely focused on performing at the highest 
levels. To get there, we strive to out-think and out-work competitors and find the best 
balance of risk and return across all investment styles on behalf of our clients. 
Responsibility 
As a fiduciary for our clients and as public company, our focus is long-term 
sustainability. We aim to be a responsible corporate citizen and to take into account 
environmental, social and governance issues that have real and quantifiable financial 
impacts over the long-term for our firm and the firms in which we invest. Long-term 
responsibility and sustainability are integrated into our business model and shareholder 
value creation framework and in the way we conduct our business, serve our clients and 
give back to the communities in which we and our clients live and work. 
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Appendix F: Database Definitions 
The following are Informa’s definitions of the accounts used to aggregate the database from which I 
gathered the reports.   
 
Account Name Definition 
Managed Account (Wrap) This code is used to identify any wrap 
product, managed account, or wrap fee 
arrangement.  
 
Limited Partnership (LP) A business organization with one or more 
general partners who manage the business 
and assume legal debts and obligations, and 
one or more limited partners who are liable 
only to the extent of their investments. 
Separate Account Composite  Representative compilation of accounts 
managed on an account-by-account basis 
subscribing to the same product style.  
 
Single Representative Account One account (out of many existing 
accounts) managed in a way that is 
representative of the account management 
style.  
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